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INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 2004, a divided three-judge panel of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit handed down a ruling which
certainly pleased the agricultural industry but which disappointed health
and environmental groups.2 The decision left the agricultural industry
free to continue its practice of burning its crop residue, while leaving the
health and environmental groups and the citizens of surrounding
communities gasping for air. The dispute arose between Kentucky
bluegrass farmers3 in portions of Idaho and citizens in surrounding
communities, and concerned the farmers’ practice of burning their fields
after the harvesting of Kentucky bluegrass seed.4 In Safe Air for
Everyone v. Meyer, the issue was whether crop residue, left over after the
harvest of Kentucky bluegrass, is a “solid waste”5 as that term is defined
under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA” or
“Act”).6 If the crop residue were considered to be a solid waste, the
plaintiffs would have a cause of action to enjoin the farmers from
burning their fields under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA.7 Two of
the three judges hearing the case held that the crop residue at issue was
not a solid waste, and dismissed the case without a trial on the merits.8
One judge dissented, stating that RCRA applies to post-harvest crop
residue and that the case should be remanded for a trial on the merits.9 A
petition for a writ of certiorari has been filed and, at the time of this
writing, is awaiting a response from the Supreme Court of the United
States.10
The ultimate outcome of this case is literally life or death for at-risk
residents of the surrounding communities. Safe Air For Everyone, a
1,000-plus member non-profit corporation, was formed by Idaho
2

See Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004).
Throughout this comment, I refer to the defendants as “farmers”, rather than
“growers.” Throughout the briefs in this case, the plaintiffs refer to the defendants as
“growers” and the defendants refer to themselves as “farmers”. The plaintiffs’ concern
might have been that courts will have more sympathy for “farmers” than they would have
with “growers” due to American ideology, which tends to romanticize the farming
culture. J.B. Rulh, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27
ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, n.9 (2000). My use of the term “farmer” does not necessarily mean
that my views coincide with those of the defendants. I use the word “farmer” simply
because it seems more natural to me.
4
Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1038.
5
Id. at 1041.
6
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-92 (2000).
7
See 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2000).
8
Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1047.
9
Id.
10
Pet. For A Writ Of Cert. By Pet’r Safe Air For Everyone, Safe Air For Everyone v.
Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 04-1055).
3
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physicians solely to put an end to the growing health care crisis in the
region caused by the defendants’ open-field burning practices.11 In its
complaint, the plaintiff alleged that at least three people had died as a
result of “episodes of acute respiratory distress precipitated by grass
residue burning.”12 Additionally, the complaint alleged that adverse
health effects included “irritation of the eyes, nose and mouth; increased
coughing and wheezing; increased respiratory illness; difficulty
breathing; decreased lung function; and possible development of lung
disease,”13 and that children, the elderly, and people with asthma, heart
disease and other respiratory illnesses are particularly placed at risk due
to the high concentrations of fine and coarse particulate matter in the
smoke from the burning fields.14
For the farmers, many of whom moved their operations to Idaho in
the wake of the State of Washington’s recent ban on the practice of openfield burning, convenience, efficiency and profits are all at stake.15 The
defendants, seventy five individuals and corporations who grow
Kentucky bluegrass for commercial profit in two areas of Northern
Idaho,16 alleged that crop residue burning is a necessary step in the
growing process as it “allows for the enhancement of water quality
because it deters soil erosion into the air and water as the result of the
lack of soil disturbance.”17 The defendants also argued that the practice
of open-field burning is necessary for many other reasons that are
“integral to producing consistent and maximum yields of a healthy seed
crop the following year.”18 These benefits include “stimulation of the
soil, recharging the root system, providing nutrients for the grass,
clearing the field and soil of harmful parasitic pests . . . eliminating
destructive mold and fungus growth . . . and ridding the soil of weed
growth.”19 The defendants argued that there are no practical alternatives
to open-field burning and that mechanical removal of the crop residue

11

Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 3-4, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
Compl. at 92-93, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
13
Id. at 90, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
14
Id. at 91, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
15
During the Safe Air trial at the district court level, Grant Pfeifer, the air quality
section supervisor for the Washington State Department of Ecology, testified that the
State of Washington concluded that grass residue burning was a health concern. In 1998,
the state banned the burning of grass seed fields finding that there were reasonable
alternatives to burning. Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 17, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
16
Id. at 4, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
17
Br. for Defs.-Appellees at 7, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
18
Id., Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
19
Id. at 7-8, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
12

240

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 1:237

would not only deprive them of the benefits of burning, but would be
economically ruinous.20
The State of Idaho has been very friendly to the growers’ concerns
and has actually encouraged Kentucky bluegrass farmers in Washington
State to relocate their operations to Idaho, where there are very limited
restrictions on the practice of open-field burning.21 Additionally, Idaho
recently sought to amend its federal Clean Air Act State Implementation
Plan (“SIP”) in an attempt to specifically list crop residue disposal as an
allowable category of open burning under the SIP.22 That proposal,
which has the preliminary approval of the Environmental Protection
Agency, is currently working its way through the rulemaking process.
Furthermore, Idaho’s Right to Farm statutes provide further protections
to agribusiness by severely restricting the rights of citizens to file
common law nuisance claims against growers of Kentucky bluegrass.23
The defendants argued that they are not disposing, discarding or
getting rid of the crop residue, because they use the crop residue by
burning it, an indispensable step in the growing cycle.24 The plaintiffs
argued that the primary reason that the defendants burn the crop residue
is to remove it in the most inexpensive manner.25 The farmers’ true
motivation for burning their fields seems to be a question of fact,
inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment. Yet two of the three
judges on the panel, looking at the facts in a light most favorable to the
plaintiffs, found that there was no material question of fact in dispute and
that the crop residue was not a solid waste as a matter of law.26
It is my contention that crop residue is a solid waste, that the
plaintiffs have raised substantial issues of material fact, and that they are
entitled to injunctive relief. There are three reasons why the Ninth
Circuit’s decision in the case should be overturned. First, the legislative
20

Id. at 8-27, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
For example, an official with the Coeur d’Alene Tribe testified at trial that number
of acres burned on that reservation has increased from 14,000 acres a few years ago to
30,000 acres today, as a result of farmers moving from Washington State after
Washington State banned crop residue burning. Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 17, Safe Air (No.
02-35751). Idaho encourages these farmers to move their operations from neighboring
states by codifying the farmer’s right to burn under the Idaho Smoke Management and
Crop Residue Disposal Act and Idaho’s Rules for Crop Residue Disposal. IDAHO CODE
§22-4803 (2004). Additionally, Idaho exempts farmers from common-law nuisance
attacks under Idaho’s Right to Farm Law, set forth in IDAHO CODE §§22-4501 to 224504 (2004).
22
Clean Air Act Approval and Promulgation of State Implementation Plans; Idaho,
69 Fed. Reg. 109 (proposed May 22, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52).
23
IDAHO CODE §§22-4501 to 22-4504.
24
Br. for Defs.-Appellees at 7, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
25
Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 36, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
26
Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1047.
21
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history makes it clear that Congress intended crop residue to be included
within the scope of RCRA. Second, the prior circuit court cases, which
the Ninth Circuit relied on in its opinion, addressing the issue of solid
waste all deal with industrial, manufacturing and municipal solid waste,
not agricultural waste. Third, common sense dictates that what the
farmers are doing here is getting rid of the grass residue, not recycling it
for some beneficial purpose.
Moreover, Congress clearly intended a broad reading of this Act.27
The narrow construction given by this court is clearly inapposite to that
intention and an example of the worst sort of judicial activism.
Additionally, the state laws which allow open-field burning of grass
residue in Idaho all have the word “disposal” in their titles and text, a
clear indication that the purpose of burning the fields is to get rid of or
dispose of the crop residue.28
Additionally, all of the cases addressing the definition of solid
waste in the recycling/reuse or continuous process context concern the
by-products of the manufacturing process, not the by-products of
agriculture.29 This makes a huge difference, as the legislative history of
the Act makes clear that Congress intended that agricultural waste,
primarily crop residue and other biomass, be regulated in order to
recover energy, and in order to encourage its use as food for livestock.30
As such, the judicial rules developed in the recycling/reuse and
continuous process cases are inappropriate in the agricultural context.
Finally, common sense dictates that the crop residue at issue in this
case should be considered a solid waste. This is so because the farmers
sold grass crop residue as animal feedstock to area cattle ranchers when
it was profitable to do so during periods of drought.31 Therefore, they
cannot claim that grass crop residue is a necessary part of the growing
process. Common sense should also dictate that if you burn the grass
27

1995).

Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1481 (9th Cir.

28
For example, Title 22, Chapter 48 of the Idaho Code is the Crop Residue Disposal
Program. Farmers wanting to burn their fields must fill out a Crop Residue Disposal
Registration Form.
29
See, e.g., United States v. Interstate Lead Co., 996 F.2d 1126 (11th Cir. 1993)
(regulating lead plates from spent automotive batteries used as a feedstock for the
smelting process); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(regulating materials used in mining operations); American Petroleum Institute v. EPA,
906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (regulating K061 slag, a byproduct of the zinc smelting
process); American Mining Congress v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (regulating
secondary materials reused within an ongoing industrial production process).
30
SYMPOSIUM ON RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY, 94TH CONG., AGENCY
TESTIMONY (Comm. Print 1976).
31
Br. for Defs.-Appellees at 5, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
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residue, only a small percentage of it is returned to the soil as fertilizer.
The rest of the residue is disposed of into the air where it drifts into
neighboring communities. Thus, the farmers are externalizing their waste
disposal problem. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit’s holding renders
superfluous the actual language of the statute, which includes agricultural
waste in its definition of solid waste.
These points will be demonstrated through an examination of the
Act, which contains exemptions in the definition of solid waste for solid
or dissolved materials in domestic sewage, solid or dissolved materials in
irrigation return flows, industrial discharges subject to the Clean Water
Act permitting process and certain by-products of the nuclear energy
industry, but contains no exemption for crop residues.32 There is no
exemption for crop residues despite the legislative history, which evinces
Congressional awareness of the issue of prescribed open-field
agricultural burning.33
Both sides have a lot at stake in this matter. Who will ultimately
prevail depends on the willingness of the Supreme Court of the United
States to grant certiorari. Thus, the first part of this comment looks at the
purposes of RCRA and its relevant provisions. In the second part of this
comment, I will analyze past court decisions that addressed the question
of what is a “solid waste.” Part three of this comment, explains the facts
of this case, the United States District Court for the District of Idaho’s
decision and the Ninth Circuit’s opinion affirming the district court. Part
four will analyze the Ninth Circuit’s decision in light of the legislative
history and explain why I believe the decision is wrong and should be
overturned by the Supreme Court of the United States.
I. THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT (“RCRA”)
Recognizing that the “disposal of solid waste and hazardous waste
in or on the land without careful planning and management can present a
danger to human health and the environment,” Congress, in 1976,
enacted RCRA, commonly referred to as the Solid Waste Disposal Act
(“SWDA”).34 Congress also found that “inadequate and environmentally
unsound practices for the disposal or use of solid waste have created
greater amounts of air and water pollution and other problems for the
environment and for health.”35 Importantly, with respect to energy,
Congress declared, that:

32
33
34
35

42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000).
S. REP. NO. 94-988 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(2) (2000).
42 U.S.C. § 6901(b)(3) (2000).
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(1) solid waste represents a potential source of solid fuel, oil, or
gas that can be converted into energy;
(2) the need exists to develop alternative energy sources for
public and private consumption in order to reduce our
dependence on such sources as petroleum products, natural gas,
nuclear and hydroelectric generation; and
(3) technology exists to produce usable energy from solid
waste.36

These declarations with respect to energy are key to an
understanding of why crop residues were intended to be considered a
solid waste subject to RCRA.37 The two objectives of the Act are to
“promote the protection of health and the environment and to conserve
valuable material and energy resources.”38
An understanding of the purposes and structure of RCRA is
necessary to understand the prior circuit court decisions in the RCRA
solid waste cases. To put it simply, “RCRA is a comprehensive
environmental statute that governs the treatment, storage, and disposal of
solid and hazardous waste.”39 Hazardous wastes are a sub-category of
solid wastes and are regulated under Subtitle C, the more onerous and
burdensome provision of the Act.40 Subtitle C hazardous wastes are
stringently regulated from the point of generation, to treatment, transport
and disposal in a cradle to grave manner. Wastes that do not qualify as
hazardous wastes, because they are neither toxic, corrosive, ignitable nor
reactive, are simply considered solid wastes and are much less
stringently regulated under Subtitle D.41
The plaintiffs did not allege that crop residue is a hazardous waste,
nor has the EPA specifically listed crop residue as a hazardous waste.
Although the smoke that is generated from burning the straw is
hazardous in the conventional sense, the straw itself is not hazardous.
While you can certainly ignite the straw (after all, that is what the
defendants do) it is not ignitable under the regulatory definition of
ignitability because it is not “capable, under standard temperature and
pressure, of causing fire through friction, absorption of moisture or
spontaneous chemical changes and, when ignited, [doesn’t] burn[] so

36
37
38
39
40
41

42 U.S.C. § 6901(d) (2000).
See discussion infra Part IV.
42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2000).
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996).
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 184 (2003).
Id. at 181.
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vigorously and persistently that it creates a hazard.”42 Thus, if crop
residue is considered a waste, it would be a solid waste regulated under
Subtitle D, not a hazardous waste regulated under Subtitle C.
The distinction between hazardous waste and solid waste is
important in the context of this case, because the definition of “solid
waste” is different if the material is a Subtitle C hazardous waste than it
is if the material is a Subtitle D solid waste. If the crop residue were a
hazardous waste, the regulatory definition of “solid waste” would apply
and that definition is narrower than the statutory definition.43 The
statutory definition of solid waste is broader:
The term “solid waste” means any garbage, refuse, sludge from a
waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air
pollution control facility and other discarded material, including
solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting
from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations,
and from community activities, but does not include solid or
dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which
are point sources subject to permits . . . or source, special nuclear,
or byproduct material . . . .44

Thus, solid waste includes any discarded material resulting from
agricultural operations. The debate in this case and in the recycling/reuse
and continuous process cases is whether or not the material is discarded.
“The broader statutory definition of solid waste applies to citizen
suits brought to abate imminent hazard to health or the environment.”45
Section 6972 of RCRA is the citizen suit provision and provides the
plaintiffs in this case standing to enjoin the defendants’ actions. It states
that before filing suit, citizens must give notice to the EPA, the state and
to any alleged violator in order to give the EPA and the state time to
begin its own action, and to give the alleged violator time to remedy the
alleged violation.46 Furthermore, no citizen action may be taken if the
State has commenced an action against the alleged violator for the
alleged violation.47 If neither the EPA nor the State have commenced an
action against the violator,

42

40 C.F.R. § 261.21(a)(2) (2005) (emphasis added).
Compare 40 C.F.R. § 261.2 (2005), with 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000).
44
42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (2000) (emphasis added).
45
Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305,
1314 (2d Cir. 1993).
46
42 U.S.C. § 6972(b) (2000).
47
42 U.S.C. § 6972(c) (2000).
43

2005]

SAFE AIR FOR EVERYONE EXCEPT IDAHO

245

[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf . . .
against any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency, to the extent permitted
by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, and including
any past or present generator, past or present transporter, or past
or present owner or operator of a treatment, storage, or disposal
facility, who has contributed or who is contributing to the past or
present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal
of any solid or hazardous waste which may present an imminent
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.48

The citizen suit provision was added to the Act with the 1984
amendments “in an effort to invigorate citizen litigation.”49 The lawsuit
in this case was filed under this citizen suit provision of RCRA.50
II. PRIOR CIRCUIT COURT CASES ADDRESSING THE DEFINITION OF
SOLID WASTE UNDER RCRA
Before looking at Safe Air’s claim, it is necessary to first review
RCRA jurisprudence in the context of disputes over what is a solid
waste. A threshold question is how broadly or narrowly the Act should
be construed. Once that scope has been determined, the courts have
considered various questions in order to determine whether a material is
a solid waste. Among these questions are: Which materials did Congress
intend to regulate? What relevance is there to the value of the material?
How much time must pass before a material is considered to be
discarded? What relevance does subjective intent play in determining
whether or not a material is a solid waste? The threshold question is
explored first.
A. Since RCRA Is a Remedial Statute, Should Its Provisions Be Read
Broadly or Narrowly?
In Hanford Downwinders, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit addressed the interpretation of remedial environmental
statutes.51 Although that case dealt with the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),
the opinion is equally applicable to a case involving RCRA. Hanford
Downwinders instructs that remedial statutes designed to protect health
and the environment are liberally construed in order to avoid frustrating

48
49
50
51

42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B) (2000) (emphasis added).
Ascon Prop., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Co., 866 F.2d 1149, 1158 (9th Cir. 1989).
Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1038.
Hanford Downwinders, 71 F.3d at 1481.
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Congress’s remedial intent.52 There can be no doubt that RCRA is a
remedial statute designed to “promote the protection of health and the
environment and to conserve valuable material and energy resources.”53
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit should follow its own precedent by
construing RCRA broadly in the context of the questions raised in the
Safe Air case.
B. What Material Did Congress Intend to Regulate?: AMC I
In American Mining Congress v. EPA, (“AMC I”) the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia provided an answer to this
question, which narrowed the scope of the EPA’s ability to regulate
waste.54 In an opinion written by Judge Starr,55 the court held that the
EPA’s regulatory authority was limited to materials that “are ‘discarded’
by virtue of being disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away.”56 The court
further held that Congress did not intend for in-process secondary
materials to be included in the scope of the Act.57
American Mining Congress (“AMC”) was one of several trade
associations representing mining and oil refining interests which
challenged the EPA’s regulatory definition of “solid waste.”58 The
regulatory definition would have allowed EPA to regulate secondary
materials reused within an industry’s ongoing production process.59
AMC maintained that these materials were neither discarded nor
intended for discard and that EPA was limited to regulating only those
materials that had been discarded. Judge Starr agreed, stating that
“Congress defined ‘solid waste’ as ‘discarded material’. The ordinary,
plain-English meaning of the word ‘discarded’ is ‘disposed of,’ ‘thrown
away’ or ‘abandoned.’ Encompassing materials retained for immediate
reuse within the scope of ‘discarded’ material strains, to say the least, the
everyday usage of that term.”60 In a footnote, Judge Starr wrote that
“[t]he dictionary definition of ‘discard’ is ‘to drop, dismiss, let go, or get
rid of as no longer useful, valuable, or pleasurable.’”61

52
53

54
55

Id.
42 U.S.C. § 6902(a) (2000).

Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Judge Kenneth Starr later became the U.S. Independent Counsel in the Whitewater
investigation of President Clinton.
56
Am. Mining Cong., 824 F.2d at 1193.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 1178.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 1183-84.
61
Id. at 1184 n.7.
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With these definitions in mind, the court looked at the industrial
processes at issue.62 In both the petroleum and mining contexts, the
primary material is processed to create other useful materials: crude oil
into gasoline, fuel oil and lubricating oils and pure metals extracted from
natural ore.63 The first pass through the processing system does not
extract all useful material from the primary material and the leftover
material must pass through the system again in order to get more out of
the primary material. Thus, the once-processed ore is reprocessed to
extract as much pure metal as possible from the natural ore and the
leftover hydrocarbons from the first refining process are returned to
system to be reprocessed into oils and fuels.64 In this context, it appeared
clear to the court that these secondary materials were not discarded
because they were “materials that are recycled or reused in an ongoing
manufacturing or industrial process [and that] these materials have not
yet become part of the waste disposal problem; rather they are destined
for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the
generating industry itself.”65
In his dissent, Judge Mikva argued that EPA’s interpretation of the
definition of solid waste was reasonable and therefore entitled to
Chevron deference.66 Judge Mikva stated that in enacting RCRA,
Congress was concerned with more than just abandoned materials.67 This
was evident from the statutory definition of “disposal” under RCRA:
The term “disposal” means the discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or
hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid
waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter
62

Id. at 1181.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 1186.
66
In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984),
the Supreme Court held that:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the
question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
court as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress
has not directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in
the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent
or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.
67
AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1196 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
63
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the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged into any
waters, including ground waters.68

According to Judge Mikva, “[t]he definition is functional: waste is
disposed under this provision if it is put into contact with land or water in
such a way as to pose the risks to health and environment that animated
Congress to pass RCRA.”69 Importantly, the intent of the manufacturer to
put the material to an additional use is irrelevant.70 In a sub-part below, I
will explore the issue of intent to see what other courts have said about
whether intent is relevant to the question of whether or not a material is a
solid waste.
The crop residue at issue in Safe Air is clearly distinguishable from
the petroleum and natural ore at issue in AMC I. First, AMC I expressly
applies to materials recycled or reused in an ongoing industrial or
manufacturing process. The court says nothing about agricultural
processes or municipal solid wastes. More importantly, the materials in
AMC I were processed and reprocessed in order to get more and more
out of the primary material. Crop residue is different. After the farmers
separate the grass seed from the straw, the straw is not reprocessed to
extract more seed. Admittedly, if after the grass seed was separated from
the straw, the crop residue was then reprocessed to extract even more
seed, then one could make an argument that the industrial and
manufacturing recycling model should apply and that the crop residue
was not yet a solid waste. But that is not what the farmers do in Idaho.
They burn it in order to get rid of it. In doing so, the burning of the crop
residue is “disposal” under Judge Mikva’s functional definition. Whether
burning the crop residue provides the farmers with some benefits or has
value beyond disposing of it is another matter and will be explored in the
next sub-part.
C. What Relevance Is There to the Value of the Material?: AMC II,
Interstate Lead Co., Inc. (“ILCO”) and API
AMC was back in court in 1990, once again challenging an EPA
regulation, which specifically listed six materials produced in mining
operations.71 In this case, commonly referred to as AMC II, AMC argued
that three of the six wastes were not discarded and therefore not
considered to be solid waste.72 It based its argument, that the materials
were not discarded because they were “beneficially reused in mineral
68
69
70
71
72

42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2000).
AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1196 (Mikva, J. dissenting).
Id. (Mikva, J. dissenting).
Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1184.
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processing operations,” on the statutory definition of solid waste and the
holding in AMC I.73 The materials in this case were sludges in surface
impoundments which were collected for possible future reclamation.74
The court, in AMC II, agreed with the EPA that the sludges could be
regulated because they were not “destined for immediate reuse in another
phase of the industry’s ongoing production process.”75 Unlike the
materials in AMC I, the sludges at issue in AMC II did not “pass[] in a
continuous stream or flow from one production process to another.”76
The fact that the sludges possessed some value in that they could be
reused was irrelevant because they were not part of an ongoing industrial
process and thus had become part of the waste disposal problem.77
Moreover, unlike the materials in AMC I, the crop residue at issue in Safe
Air is distinguishable because it is neither the result of an industrial
operation, nor is it truly part of a continuous stream or flow from one
production process to another. This will become clear below in part
three, which explains the Kentucky bluegrass growing process.
The value issue was also addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Interstate Lead Co. (“ILCO”).78 The defendant in that
case was a recycler of spent automotive batteries. The EPA asserted that
reclaimed lead plates were waste products.79 ILCO’s contention was that
the lead plates were not a solid waste because they were not discarded
but were instead a valuable feedstock for the smelting process.80 The
court held that the EPA’s determination that the lead plates were a solid
waste was a reasonable interpretation entitled to Chevron deference.
“Somebody has discarded the battery in which these components are
found. This fact does not change just because a reclaimer has purchased
or finds value in the components.”81
The defendants in Safe Air might argue that ILCO is distinguishable
because they do not purchase the crop residue, but instead produce it
themselves. However, the ILCO court expressly recognized and
incorporated the holding in AMC II, that materials may be classified as
discarded “whether the materials were discarded by one user and sent to
another for recycling, or stored before recycling by the person who
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Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1186.
Id. (quoting AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1185).
AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1190.
AMC II, 907 F.2d at 1186.
ILCO, 996 F.2d at 1131.
Id. at 1129.
Id. at 1131.
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initially discarded them in land disposal units.”82 Importantly, the ILCO
court recognized that materials may have both primary and secondary
characters. The primary character of the lead plates was that they had
been discarded. The secondary character was that they were a valuable
recyclable material. “Therefore, we find these batteries and their contents
are ‘discarded’ within the everyday sense of the word. Their secondary
character as recyclable material is irrelevant to that determination.”83
This is important because, as explained in more detail below in part
three, the primary reason that the crop residue is burned is that it is
unwanted and must be removed from the fields in order to facilitate the
growth of the next crop. The primary character of the crop residue is thus
a discarded material. The secondary character as a source of ash to be
used as a fertilizer and any other incidental benefits are thus irrelevant to
the determination of whether the crop residue is a solid waste.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that K061 slag, a byproduct of the zinc smelting
process, is a solid waste because it is discarded before being subject to
metals reclamation.84 In American Petroleum Institute v. EPA (“API”),
the court stated that:
[I]t is [] immaterial under AMC [I] that the method of waste
treatment prescribed by the agency results in the production of
something of value, namely reclaimed metals. Indeed, the AMC
[I] decision expressly disavowed a reading of the statute that
would prevent EPA from regulating processes for extracting
valuable products from discarded materials that qualify as
hazardous wastes.85

The K061 slag at issue in API is analogous to the crop residue at
issue in Safe Air because the farmers contend that they extract valuable
fertilizer in the form of ash from the burning process, but that does not
change the character of the crop residue when it is discarded from the
combine machines. It is thus immaterial under AMC I that the method of
waste treatment conducted by the growers results in the production of
something of value.
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Id. at 1132 (quoting AMC II, 907 F.2d at 1186-87).
Id.
Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Id. at n.16.
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D. How Much Time Must Pass Before a Material Is Considered To Be
Discarded?: Connecticut Coastal Fishermen and Owen Electric
There have been few cases seeking to resolve the issue of how
much time must pass before a material is considered to be discarded,
presumably because the AMC I and AMC II courts have made it fairly
clear that a material must be destined for immediate reuse. Nevertheless,
the timing issue has been raised in a couple of cases and are thus worth
examining. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed this issue in Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v.
Remington Arms Co., Inc.86 The defendants in that case owned and
operated a trap and skeet shooting club, originally formed in the
1920’s.87 Nearly five million pounds of lead shot and eleven million
pounds of clay target fragments were deposited on the land and in
adjacent waters over the seventy years of the club’s existence.88 The
defendants argued that the lead shot and clay target fragments were not
solid waste because “any disposal of waste that occurred was merely
incidental to the normal use of a product.”89 The critical issue thus
became: “[a]t what point after a lead shot is fired at a clay target do the
materials become discarded? Does the transformation from useful to
discarded material take place the instant the shot is fired or sometime
later?”90 The court did not give an exact answer to this question, but
simply said that in this case the materials had accumulated long enough
to be considered solid waste. Thus, at one extreme, materials that have
accumulated for seventy years have been discarded and at the other
extreme, materials destined for immediate reuse have not been discarded.
A case out of the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reaffirmed
the immediacy requirement, even when combined with a value issue. The
sole issue in Owen Electric Steel Co. v. Browner was “whether the ‘slag’
produced by petitioner Owen . . . as a byproduct of steel production
[was] ‘discarded’ and therefore constitute[d] a ‘solid waste’ under
[RCRA].”91 The court held that “the fundamental inquiry in determining
whether a byproduct has been ‘discarded’ is whether the byproduct is
immediately recycled for use in the same industry.”92 The slag in Owen
Electric sat curing for six months before being sold to other entities and
thus was discarded and classified as a solid waste. This case is interesting
86
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90
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92

Connecticut Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n, 989 F.2d 1305 at 1316.
Id. at 1308.
Id.
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1314.
Owen Electric Steel Co. v. Browner, 37 F.3d 146, 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id. at 150.
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because it combines the timing issue with the value issue and found that
the slag was a solid waste. Another issue in this case, and in all of these
cases for that matter, is the issue of whether the stated intent of the waste
disposer or waste generator makes any difference. This is the final issue
and is explored in the next sub-part.
E. What Relevance Does Stated Intent Play in Determining Whether or
Not a Material Is a Solid Waste?: Fiorillo and AMC II Revisited.
Should the generator’s stated intent be considered in determining
whether the material is discarded, abandoned or disposed of, or should
actions speak louder than words? In other words, should Judge Mikva’s
dissent control, making the definition a functional definition? Both the
Ninth Circuit and the D.C. Circuit have held that stated intent makes no
difference, and that the court must look to the actual intent instead.
In United States v. Fiorillo, the Ninth Circuit heard the appeals of
Frank Fiorillo and Art Krueger for their criminal convictions of wire
fraud and violations of RCRA.93 Fiorillo and Krueger, who both operated
warehousing businesses, had contracted with a manufacturer of industrial
cleaning products for the disposal of 30,000 gallons of highly caustic
industrial strength cleansers.94 In fact, only a small percentage of the
waste was properly disposed of in accordance with RCRA.95 The rest
was illegally stored in warehouses, which also contained Class A
explosives, including 17,000 artillery shells.96 Krueger argued that his
conviction under RCRA should be overturned because there was not
enough evidence to conclude that the cleaning products were hazardous
wastes.97 The court held that in order to prove that the cleaning products
were hazardous wastes, the government was required to demonstrate that
the products had been discarded. If the manufacturer of the cleaning
products “intended to dispose of the hazardous materials, it became
hazardous waste.”98 Thus, according to the Ninth Circuit, the actual
intent of the generator, not the stated intent, is the key to determine
whether or not a material is discarded. This is a functional definition.
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit was unimpressed with AMC’s argument
that they did not intend to discard the sludges from wastewater stored in
surface impoundments, but were instead saving them for future
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United States v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1142.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1154.
Id.
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beneficial reclamation.99 While there was no explicit discussion in that
case about whether intent was a factor in their decision, their holding
indicates that a lack of intent to discard would not have made a
difference. In part four, I will examine whether intent should play a part
in deciding whether a material has been discarded.
III. THE DISPUTE BETWEEN SAFE AIR FOR EVERYONE AND THE
DEFENDANT FARMERS
A. How to Grow Kentucky Bluegrass: The Basics
Before examining the court’s opinion, it is first necessary to
understand the basics of growing Kentucky bluegrass. Initially, the seed
is planted in the spring, but does not flower until the summer of the
following year.100 Once the grass has grown between fifteen and thirtysix inches and has flowered, the farmers cut the crop within a few inches
of the ground.101 This leaves some stubble that is needed for plant
regeneration. Subsequent years’ crops grow out of the crown of the
bluegrass plant, which is located at or below the soil surface, under the
stubble, which is why the farmers cannot simply plough under the crop
residue.102 The cut crop is left in the field to dry for several weeks.103 The
seed is then harvested using combines that separate the seed from the
straw.104 The valuable seed is then collected and sold while the residue
including the straw and the stubble are left in the field. This residue must
be removed in order to allow moisture and sunlight to reach the crown
during the fall regeneration period.105 The residue can either be removed
mechanically, or it can be removed by burning it away.106 The farmers in
this case remove the crop residue by burning it.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Opinion Affirming the District Court in Safe Air
For Everyone v. Meyer
Judge Ronald M. Gould, joined by Judge Kim McLane Wardlaw,
wrote the three-part opinion.107 An understanding of how Kentucky
bluegrass is grown is needed to understand the defendant’s motivations.
99
100
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102
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Amer. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179, 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Br. of Pl.-Appellant at 5, Safe Air (No. 02-35751).
Id.
Id. at 5-7.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1036.
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Thus, the opinion began in Part I with a primer on the growing of
Kentucky bluegrass and a brief summary of the procedural history.108
Part II of the opinion discussed the procedural posture of the case in
greater detail.109 Part III was the heart of the opinion and reviewed the
merits of the plaintiff’s claims.110
1. Opinion Part I
After a primer on Kentucky bluegrass farming, the court briefly
explained the procedural history of the case: Safe Air filed suit on May
31, 2002, under RCRA’s citizen suit provisions, alleging that the
defendant’s practice of open field burning caused a substantial
endangerment to health and the environment.111 The plaintiff also sought
a preliminary injunction to prevent the farmers from continuing the
practice of burning the post-harvest residue.112 The farmers filed a
response in opposition to the preliminary injunction and a motion to
dismiss the claim based on a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.113 The
district court held an evidentiary hearing on Safe Air’s request for a
preliminary injunction during three days of testimony from July 10-12,
2002, hearing testimony from twenty-three witnesses.114 On July 19,
2002, the district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that it did
not have subject matter jurisdiction, because, among other reasons, the
crop residue at issue was not “solid waste” under RCRA.115 The Ninth
Circuit concluded Part I noting that Safe Air appealed, that federal courts
had subject matter jurisdiction, but that it was affirming the lower court’s
decision.116
2. Opinion Part II
Safe Air’s appeal was based on two arguments. Its first argument
was that the district court erred by considering evidence from the
preliminary injunction hearing, evidence which was outside the four
corners of the complaint.117 The plaintiff argued that the court should
have converted the motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion
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Id. at 1037.
Id. at 1038-40.
Id. at 1040-47.
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under Rule 56.118 Its second argument maintained that the district court
erred by holding that the question of whether the crop residue was a solid
waste was a jurisdictional issue.119 The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the
first argument, but agreed with the second argument.120 It held that “[t]he
district court erred in characterizing its dismissal of Safe Air’s complaint
under Rule 12(b)(1) because the jurisdictional issue and substantive
issues in this case are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is
dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the merits.”121
Additionally, the court stated that “[i]n resolving a factual attack on
jurisdiction, the district court may review evidence beyond the complaint
without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary
judgment.”122 For these reasons, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district
court’s order not as a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but
as a grant of summary judgment on the merits for the farmers.123
3. Opinion Part III
Because the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s order as a
grant of summary judgment in favor of the farmers, the standard of
review was de novo.124 Thus, the court stated that it would view the
evidence in a light most favorable to Safe Air to determine whether there
were any genuine issues of material fact.125 The court then provided a
cursory overview of RCRA and noted that Safe Air had the burden to
establish that the Kentucky bluegrass residue was “solid waste” within
the meaning of RCRA.126
After a brief overview of the canons of statutory construction, the
court discussed the statutory definition of “solid waste” under RCRA.127
Focusing on “other discarded material,” the court noted that RCRA does
not define “discarded material,” but that the dictionary defines “discard”
as to “cast aside; reject; abandon; give up.”128 “We consider the term
‘discard’ in its ordinary meaning to decide whether Safe Air presented a
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Id.
Id.
Id. at 1039-40.
Id. at 1040.
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1040.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1041. That definition can be found in Part I of this Comment.
Id. (citing THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 684 (4th ed. 1993)).
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genuine issue of material fact supporting its contention that the Kentucky
bluegrass residue burnt by the Growers is ‘solid waste’ under RCRA.”129
The court next discussed prior circuit court cases addressing the
question of what is a solid waste, focusing its attention on those aspects
of the cases that it believed helped answer the question. First, the court
reviewed AMC I. “Significant for our purposes, AMC I determined that
materials have not contributed to a waste disposal problem where ‘they
are destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by
the generating industry itself.’”130 Next, it considered AMC II’s holding
that materials being held for potential reuse constitute discarded
material.131 The court also considered the time element by looking at the
language of Connecticut Coastal, where the Second Circuit held that the
material had “accumulated long enough.”132 Finally, the court addressed
the value element as discussed in ILCO. In a footnote, the court stated:
We recognize that the issue of monetary value does not affect the
analysis of whether materials are “solid waste” under RCRA. As
the Eleventh Circuit held in ILCO, the fact that discarded
materials are “solid waste” under RCRA does not change “just
because a reclaimer has purchased or finds value in the
components.” However, in this case the Growers do not base
their argument on the assertion that grass residue has monetary
value to someone; rather, the Growers argue that grass residue is
not solid waste because they immediately reuse it to further
successful bluegrass harvests.133

Finding these cases to be persuasive, the Ninth Circuit decided to
evaluate the evidence to determine: (1) whether the crop residue is
destined for beneficial reuse or recycling in a continuous process by the
farmers themselves (an AMC I analysis); (2) whether the crop residue is
being actively reused, or whether it merely has the potential to be reused
(an AMC II analysis); and (3) whether the crop residue is being reused by
the farmers or by someone else (an ILCO analysis).134 Judge Gould then
reviewed the evidence presented in the hearing on Safe Air’s request for
a preliminary injunction. The bulk of the opinion with regard to the
evidence focused on the evidence submitted by the farmers. First, the
court noted that the farmers presented evidence that they do not discard
the crop residue, but rather reuse it in a continuous process of growing
129
130
131
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Id. at 1041.
Id. at 1042 (citing AMC I, 824 F.2d at 1186).
Id. at 1042.
Id. at 1042 (citing Connecticut Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1316).
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Id. at 1043.
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Kentucky bluegrass and that this reuse provides the benefits of both
returning nutrients to the soil and facilitating the open burning process.135
Additionally, the farmers presented evidence that open burning provides
four critical benefits for Kentucky bluegrass farmers. First, open field
burning extends the productive life of the fields. Second, open field
burning restores beneficial minerals and fertilizers to the fields. Third,
open field burning reduces or eliminates insects, weeds, and disease,
reducing the need to use pesticides. Finally, open field burning blackens
the soil, maximizing sunlight absorption.136
Safe Air did not dispute that the grass residue provided some
benefit to the farmers, but that the claimed benefits were merely
incidental and that the primary goal of burning the residue is to get rid of
it.137 The court was not persuaded by Safe Air’s argument that the benefit
must be more than merely incidental, holding that “even when we review
the evidence in the light most favorable to Safe Air, there is no dispute
that the Growers realize farming benefits from reusing grass residue in
the process of open burning.”138 Furthermore, the court held that:
Because there is undisputed evidence that the Growers reuse the
grass residue in a continuous farming process effectively designed to
produce Kentucky bluegrass, there is no genuine issue of material fact as
to whether grass residue is ‘discarded material.’ It is not. The bluegrass
residue is not discarded, abandoned, or given up, and it does not qualify
as ‘solid waste’ under RCRA.139
Applying the factors noted in the other circuit court cases, the court
found that the grass residue is destined for immediate beneficial reuse by
the farmers who were its original owners, and that there was no genuine
issue of material fact as to whether grass residue is discarded.140
Turning his attention to RCRA’s legislative history, Judge Gould
opined that “the burning of bluegrass residue by farmers is not the evil
against which Congress took aim.”141 Citing a House Report, the court
noted that “RCRA was intended as ‘a multi-faceted approach toward
solving the problems associated with the 3-4 billion tons of discarded
materials generated each year, and the problems resulting from
anticipated 8% annual increase in the volume of such waste.’”142
135
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Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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Importantly, the court cited the same House Report which stated that
“much industrial and agricultural waste is reclaimed or put to new use
and is therefore not a part of the discarded materials disposal problem the
committee addresses . . . . Agricultural wastes which are returned to the
soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners are not considered discarded
materials in the sense of this legislation.”143
In a footnote, Judge Gould wrote what I consider to be the portion
of the opinion most open to criticism. I will address these criticisms in
part four of this comment. Its significance is such that it is reprinted here
in its entirety:
Referring to the House Report’s comment that “agricultural
wastes which are returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil
conditions are not considered discarded materials in the sense of
this legislation,” Safe Air argues that “if the Growers mulched
their residue and returned it to the soil, this sentence might have
applicability. But that is not what they do. They burn the residue .
. . .” This argument has some weight but is not dispositive. It is
true that a part of the residue is returned to soil while a part that
is smoke is carried off by air. Yet, for materials to be solid waste
under RCRA, they must be “discarded.” The determination of
whether grass residue has been “discarded” is made
independently of how the materials are handled. Despite the fact
that a portion of residue becomes airborne smoke, the residue is
not thereby automatically “discarded.”144

Finally, the court addressed the four arguments made by the dissent
and concluded its opinion by stating that it could not discern any
congressional declaration or intent to prohibit the established farming
practice of open field burning, the fact that there were benefits to the
farmers was beyond dispute, and that there was no issue of material fact
as to whether the grass residue was a solid waste under RCRA.145 Since,
in the court’s opinion, the grass residue was not a solid waste, the court
declined to address whether the farmers’ handling constituted “disposal,”
“treatment,” or “handling” of solid waste, nor did it address whether the
burning of the fields constitutes an “imminent and substantial
endangerment” under RCRA.146
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Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 3 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6238, 6239).
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4. Judge Paez’s Dissent
Judge Paez concurred with Part II of the majority opinion,
concluding that the court should review the district court’s dismissal for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction as a grant of summary judgment on the
merits.147 However, he dissented with regard to Part III because he
disagreed with the legal standard applied by the majority.148 It was his
conclusion that the grass residue was discarded and that RCRA should
apply to grass residue.149 Furthermore, even if he were to agree with the
majority’s interpretation of RCRA, he felt that there were genuine issues
of material fact and he would therefore reverse the district court’s
judgment and remand for trial.150
Judge Paez had no trouble concluding that Safe Air had presented
sufficient evidence to show that the grass residue was discarded. He
discussed the fact that Safe Air presented testimony as well as affidavits
from its members, individuals in the community and experts in the
medical and agricultural fields.151 Safe Air established that it is necessary
to remove the grass residue in order to maintain seed yields, and it was
the plaintiff’s contention that the primary purpose of burning the fields is
to remove the grass residue.152 The farmers did not dispute Safe Air’s
contention that they must remove the grass residue from the fields. As
such, Judge Paez concluded that “[b]ecause there is no dispute that the
Growers burn the post-harvest residue to remove it from the fields, and
because this act of removal is within the plain meaning of ‘discard,’ I
would reverse the district court’s judgment and remand for further
proceedings.”153
As to statutory construction, Judge Paez argued that the majority
looked beyond the plain meaning of the word “discard” when it
considered the factors gleaned from the other circuit court cases
addressing the meaning of the word “discard.”154 Furthermore, those
cases cited by the majority occurred in distinctly different contexts.155
Finally, even if those cases were to be considered, he would conclude
that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the grass
residue is destined for beneficial reuse in a continual process.156
147
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Id. (Paez, J. dissenting).
Id. (Paez, J. dissenting).
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The dissent’s review of the legislative history was more
comprehensive than that of the majority. For example, Judge Paez
pointed out that “Congress intended solid waste to include any discarded
material resulting from agricultural operations.”157 Additionally, he noted
that “[w]hen RCRA was enacted, agricultural waste was the second
largest source of waste in this country, producing 687 million tons per
year.”158 Furthermore, EPA regulation 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(b)(2) indicates
that residue from agricultural crops returned to the soil as fertilizers are
solid wastes, but not hazardous wastes.159 Judge Paez stated that
Congress could not have intended to exclude from the scope of RCRA
agricultural waste that is first burned before being used as a fertilizer,
given Congress’s expressed concern with waste which is burned and
results in harmful air pollution.160 “Thus, the fact that the residue is
burned, rather than mulched and returned to the soil, is relevant to
whether the residue constitutes ‘solid waste’ under RCRA.”161
Judge Paez criticized the majority for finding the extra-circuit cases
persuasive in its analysis, because those cases were dealing with solid
wastes that were also hazardous wastes, thus implicating the narrower
regulatory definition of solid waste.162 He stated that, once again, even if
he were to find those cases persuasive, there were genuine issues of
material fact as to whether the materials had been discarded, thus making
summary judgment inappropriate.163 The crux of the dispute was that
Safe Air contended that the farmers’ primary purpose in burning the
grass residue is to remove it, whereas the farmers contended that the
grass residue is an important and valuable material used in the
agricultural process. “Thus, there are decidedly different accounts of
whether and how the post-harvest crop residue factors into the continuing
growth process.”164 In fact, Safe Air presented expert testimony
vigorously contesting the farmers’ assertion that they reuse the grass
residue in a continuous process.165
In the last part of his dissent, Judge Paez addressed whether the
burning of the grass residue “constituted past or present handling,
storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
157

Id. (Paez, J. dissenting) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27)) (ellipses omitted).
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waste which may present an imminent and substantial endangerment to
health or the environment.”166 He concluded, based on the statutory
definitions of “treatment” and “disposal” that RCRA applies to the
burning of the grass residue and that he would reverse the summary
judgment in favor of the farmers and remand the case for trial.167
IV. ANALYSIS: WHY THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION SHOULD BE
OVERTURNED
There are several reasons why the Ninth Circuit’s decision in the
Safe Air case should be overturned. First, the legislative history evinces
congressional concern with the amount of agricultural waste being
produced, coupled with existing poor disposal practices and a recognition
that crop residues could be used as a source of energy and animal
feedstock. Second, previously decided circuit court cases addressing the
question of what is a solid waste have never addressed the question of
agricultural waste. All of the prior cases dealt with industrial and mining
wastes. Congress recognized the difference as is evident from the
legislative history. The courts should recognize that difference as well.
Third, common sense tells us that the farmers are primarily concerned
with getting rid of the crop residue. That they derive some benefit from
the ash that remains is inconsequential. I will address each of these
reasons in turn.
A. Legislative History
First, the legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended
crop residue to be considered a solid waste. Congress enacted RCRA to
deal with the ever increasing problem of waste disposal in the United
States. In a statement to the Senate, Senator Randolph stated that “our
society generates 4.4 billion tons of solid waste annually. The principal
sources are animal wastes, 1.7 billion tons; and agricultural wastes, 640
million tons. Industrial sources account for 140 million tons. Urban
wastes amount to 230 million tons annually.”168 Similarly, in a statement
to the House, Congressman Brown stated:
Many kinds of waste are covered by the term “solid waste.”
About 2.8 billion tons of all kinds of solid waste are generated
every year in the United States. Of this, about 1.783 million tons
are from mining; 687 million tons are agricultural; 260 million
166
167
168

Id. at 1053 (Paez, J. dissenting) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6972(a)(1)(B)).
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121 CONG. REC. 23849 (1975).

262

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 1:237

tons are industrial; 135 million tons are municipal; and 7 million
tons are sewage sludge. These last two categories usually attract
the most attention and present the worst problem because both
our populations and the wastes are concentrated in the same
places. Because of the volume of municipal waste generated and
its concentration, municipal landfills are about to reach their
capacity.169

The legislative history makes it clear that agricultural wastes were
covered by the term “solid waste” under RCRA.
The agricultural wastes that Congress was concerned with when it
enacted RCRA were, for the most part, crop residues. Congress
recognized that agricultural wastes were not the kind of wastes that were
overflowing municipal landfills. Instead, crop residues represented a
potential source of energy. It is important to remember that RCRA is the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act. “The term ‘resource recovery’
means material or energy recovered from solid waste.”170 Congress was
not just concerned about overflowing landfills; it was also concerned
with energy recovery and it saw the potential for energy recovery in crop
residue. For example, David T. Bardin of the New Jersey State
Environmental Protection Agency testified before Congress that:
The possible savings are even more dramatic in the case of
agriculture and plant wastes, which could either be burned or
converted to animal feed with a great savings in energy. Indeed if
this country, rural areas as well as urbanized areas, were to
recover only fifty percent of the energy potential of agricultural
and other plant life, we would supply ten percent of the country’s
total energy needs.171

In another hearing, Dr. James S. Kane, Deputy Assistant
Administrator for the Conservation, Energy Research and Development
Administration stated:
We must search for the hundreds of ways in which our society
wastes energy and set about to correct each one. Waste utilization
is an excellent example. Rather than using energy to get rid of
waste, we will seek uses of all sorts which can yield useful
energy. We are, therefore, planning a high priority program that
includes research and development of technologies for the
recovery of energy from all kinds of wastes: municipal,
169

122 CONG. REC. 32598 (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 6903(22) (2000).
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EPA, ERDA, Interior, Commerce and Justice Testimony at House Interstate and
Foreign Commerce Subcommittee Symposium on Resource Conservation and Recovery,
94th Cong. 56 (1976) (statement of David T. Bardin).
170
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industrial, agricultural, and forestry. The potential energy from
utilization of solid wastes is large, totaling something over 1
billion tons per year, with a carbon content equivalent to about
500 million tons of coal. This includes municipal residues—trash
and garbage; agricultural residues—such as wheat and cornstalks
and including animal wastes; and forestry wastes—sawdust,
shavings, bark, and scrap, but excluding slash remaining in the
forests. Nearly three-fourths of this is associated with agricultural
and animal wastes.172

During that same hearing, Roger W. Sant, Assistant Administrator
for Energy Conservation and the Environment of the Federal Energy
Administration testified that “[a]gricultural residues contain significantly
more latent energy than urban wastes. Most agricultural waste is quite
dispersed and much of it is unavailable from energy and economic
standpoints. However, given the large volume of agricultural wastes,
utilizing even a small percentage of it as an energy source would be
significant.”173
Thus, there is an extensive legislative history focusing on the
recovery of energy from crop residue. RCRA was enacted when the
country was still suffering economically from the oil embargo of 1973
and the resulting energy crisis, so, it makes sense that Congress intended
to include crop residue under RCRA. What, other than crop residue,
could Congress have been concerned with when it stated that “[t]he term
‘solid waste’ means any garbage, refuse . . . or other discarded material .
. . resulting from . . . agricultural operations”?174
There are two portions of the legislative history that might appear
to undermine this argument. However, I will demonstrate that these
portions provide further support for my argument. The first of these was
a comment in a Senate Committee Report which stated that:
If guidelines on open dumping are published for agricultural
waste management, the Committee intends that such guidelines
reflect that fire (prescribed or controlled burning) has historically
been a tool in agriculture, forestry, and wildlife management
operations. These uses of prescribed or controlled fire are being
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976: Hearing on H.R. 5487 and H.R.
406 Before the Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce of the Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong. 457 (1976) (Statement of Dr. James S.
Kane, Deputy Assistant Administrator, New Jersey Department of Environmental
Protection).
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Id. at 532 (Statement of Roger W. Sant, Assistant Administrator for Energy
Conservation and the Environment of the Federal Energy Administration).
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regulated by the States under the Clean Air Act and the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act.175

It would be a mistake to read this comment to exclude all types of
agricultural burning from the scope of RCRA. First, the comment was
made with reference to guidelines on open dumping. This is not what the
farmers are doing with the grass residue here. Second, and more
importantly, Congress was aware that fire had historically been a tool
used in agriculture, yet it did not choose to include prescribed or
controlled burning in its list of exceptions to the definition of “solid
waste.”176 Thus, the comment should not be read to insert language that
Congress could have, but did not write into the statute.
The second comment from the legislative history that might be read
adversely to my argument was referenced in note thirteen of the majority
opinion and is discussed in part three of this comment, regarding
agricultural wastes which are returned to the soil as fertilizers.177 The
specific comment from the legislative history was that “agricultural
wastes which are returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners are
not considered discarded materials in the sense of this legislation.”178
Agricultural interests would contend, in light of this comment, that by
burning the crop residue, they are returning fertilizers to the soil. Safe
Air argued that this portion of the legislative history is applicable to crop
residue that is mulched or ploughed under. Interestingly, the majority
agreed with Safe Air that its argument had some weight but did not find
it dispositive.179 If the argument had some weight, then the court, looking
at the evidence in a light most favorable to Safe Air, should not have
granted summary judgment for the farmers. The majority included a
standard recitation of the standard of review for summary judgment.180
However, it is a question of fact, not a question of law, whether the
175

S. REP. NO. 94-988, at 13 (1976).
Recall that under 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27), the exceptions to the definition of “solid
waste” is limited to “solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges which are point sources
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Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1046 n.13.
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H.R. REP. No. 94-1491, at 2 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6239.
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Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1046 n.13.
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Id. at 1040 n.4. Here, the court stated:
Viewed in this light, we will review the ruling de novo. Viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, we determine
whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district
court correctly applied the relevant substantive law. We do not weigh the
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Id. (internal citation omitted).
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farmers were returning fertilizers to the soil or whether they were getting
rid of the crop residue.
Unfortunately for Safe Air, the majority did, in fact, weigh the
evidence and in doing so granted summary judgment to the farmers.
B. Prior Circuit Court Cases
The second reason that Safe Air should be overturned is that the
prior circuit court cases that addressed the issue of what is a solid waste
all dealt with industrial and mining wastes that were also hazardous
wastes. Agricultural wastes are different. Thus there is no reason to
believe that EPA regulations for hazardous waste disposal, nor judicially
created factors used to help determine whether an industrial or mining
waste is a solid waste, should also be used to help determine whether
agricultural wastes are solid wastes. This is because RCRA was
supposed to address not only the problems of overflowing landfills and
hazardous waste disposal, but also the need to convert animal and
agricultural waste into fuels for energy recovery. The legislative history
makes it clear that industrial waste was contributing to the problem of
overflowing landfills, but that agricultural waste, primarily crop residue,
was not. When the majority stated that “[t]he burning of bluegrass
residue by farmers is not the evil against which Congress took aim,”181 it
focused on the landfill problem addressed by RCRA but ignored the
other purpose of RCRA, energy recovery. Crop residue does not need to
be part of the problem in order to be a “solid waste,” because it was
hoped that it could be part of the solution to the country’s energy needs.
C. Common Sense
The third reason that Safe Air should be overturned is based on
common sense reasoning. Common sense tells us that what the farmers
are doing in this case is disposing or getting rid of the grass residue. If
the farmers burn their fields and ninety-nine percent of the crop residue
is either consumed in the fire or drifts off into neighboring communities
in the form of smoke and only one percent of the crop residue remains in
the field, does it make any sense to say that what the farmers are doing is
returning fertilizers to the soil? They burn it to get rid of it and the
burning happens to leave some useful ash residue behind. An analogous
argument was used by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit in National Mining Ass’n v. United States Army
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Corps of Engineers.182 That case was concerned with incidental fallback
during dredging operations and whether this incidental fallback of the
dredged materials constituted an addition of a pollutant under the Clean
Water Act. The court held that:
[T]he straightforward statutory term “addition” cannot
reasonably be said to encompass the situation in which material
is removed from the waters of the United States and a small
portion of it happens to fall back. Because incidental fallback
represents a net withdrawal, not an addition, of material, it cannot
be a discharge. . . . Congress could not have contemplated that
the attempted removal of 100 tons of that substance could
constitute an addition simply because only 99 tons of it were
actually taken away.183

Like the dredged material in National Mining Ass’n, Congress
could not have intended that burning agricultural residue, which leaves
only trace amounts of usable material behind, could constitute a return to
the soil as fertilizer. Here, there is clearly a net disposal through burning,
not a return to the soil as fertilizer. Therefore, common sense tells us that
the farmers are discarding the crop residue, not recycling or reusing it in
a continuous process.
Similarly, the farmers contended that burning is an integral step in a
continuous process. However, when there was money to be made, they
sold the crop residue to area cattle farmers for use as cattle feedstock.
Thus, burning is not an essential step in a recycling process. This
strengthens Safe Air’s argument that the farmers want to get rid of the
grass residue in the most economic way possible. Can it really be said
that this is the same thing as “recycling or reuse” or “returning the
fertilizers to the soil?” The farmers’ actual intent as it can be inferred
from their actions is the issue here, not their post-hoc stated intent. If the
Ninth Circuit follows its own precedent,184 then it should look to the
farmers’ actual intent, and if it does look to the farmers’ actual intent,
then there is clearly a genuine issue of material fact in dispute.
Finally, common sense tells us that Congress intended to include
crop residue in its definition of solid waste because any other conclusion
would render superfluous the words “agricultural waste” contained
within the statute. It would make no sense for Congress to include in its
definition of solid waste the term “agricultural waste” if it did not intend
that crop residue would be covered by RCRA. Keeping in mind that one
182
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of the primary purposes of RCRA was to find alternative energy
sources,185 what else, besides crop residue, could Congress have been
concerned with when it included agricultural waste within its definition
of solid waste? What was Senator Randolph referring to when he said
that our society produces 640 million tons of agricultural waste annually,
if not crop residue?186
Because the legislative history and common sense tell us that
Congress intended crop residue to be included in the definition of solid
waste, and because none of the prior circuit court cases deal with the
unique character of agricultural waste, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
Safe Air should be overturned. The farmers should be enjoined from
burning the grass residue because it poses a substantial and imminent
endangerment to both health and the environment.
In conclusion, it is evident that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion was
poorly reasoned. A more searching analysis of RCRA’s legislative
history, viewed through the lens of the energy crisis of the early 1970’s,
would have revealed that Congress clearly intended that crop residues
should be included in the definition of “solid waste” because crop
residues were seen as a potential source of energy. Thus, applying the
industrial and manufacturing solid waste model to agricultural wastes
makes no sense, given the two purposes of RCRA: (1) stemming the
rising tide of waste in landfills from industrial, manufacturing and
municipal solid wastes, and (2) finding new sources of energy from
agricultural and animal wastes.187 Moreover, common sense tells us that
these farmers are simply getting rid of the waste in the least expensive
manner possible. Their intent is to discard the waste. Therefore, the crop
residue is a solid waste and the plaintiff should be able to enjoin the
farmers from burning their fields and causing health problems for the
citizens of the surrounding communities.
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42 U.S.C. § 6901(d) (2000).
122 CONG. REC. 23849 (1975).
See 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2000).
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